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Integrating Farmer Decision Making
to Target Land Retirement Programs
Wanhong Yang and Murat Isik
This study develops a model to examine the impacts of uncertainty about crop production and irrever-
sibility of program participation on determining land rental payments and least-cost land retirement
targeting in the Conservation Reserve Enhancement Program (CREP). Results show that under risk
aversion only, the marginal cost of abatement and the average land rental payment are less than those
under risk neutrality. However, under uncertainty and irreversibility, the marginal cost of abatement
and the average land rental payment are considerably higher than those under risk neutrality or risk
aversion only. It is important to incorporate uncertainty and irreversibility into the design of land
rental payments and in determining participation constraints.
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Since 1990, the Conservation Reserve Program
(CRP) has been gradually moving toward a multi-
faceted environmental improvement program
through the introduction of an environmental bene-
fit index (EBI)
1 [U.S. Department of Agriculture/
Farm Service Agency (USDA/FSA), 1997]. With a
bidding system, the CRP targets the retirement of
cropland that exhibits high environmental benefits
relative to economic costs (Feather, Hellerstein, and
Hansen, 1999). In addition, the continuous CRP and
the Conservation Reserve Enhancement Program
(CREP) have been established to encourage land
retirement for specific conservation practices such
as filter strips and riparian buffers, and in areas of
environmental significance.
2 The continuous CRP
and the CREP accept submitted contracts as long as
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1 The EBI is composed of six environmental factors: wildlife, water
quality, erosion, enduring benefits, air quality, and state or national con-
servation priority area.
2 The continuous CRP is different from the general CRP and provides
producers the opportunity to enroll acreage in specific conservation prac-
tices and areas year-round. The CREP is a joint federal-state program to
address environmental problems of state significance. Enrollment is
usually conducted under the continuous CRP with incentives from both
federal and state governments.
the contracts address important conservation needs
such as proposing conservation practices on the land
to be retired or locating in the program definition
area. Furthermore, ample program payments, includ-
ing annual rental payments and additional incentive
payments, are provided to encourage program
participation (Smith, 2000). As a result, program
payments in the continuous CRP and the CREP are
considerably higher than the local soil rental rates.
For example, the average Illinois CREP payment
from 1998 to 2002 was $158 per acre, in contrast to
the average soil rental rate of $108 per acre in the
CREP program area [USDA/FSA, 2003; Illinois
Department of Natural Resources (IDNR), 1999].
While this pattern can be explained by additional
incentives for promoting conservation practices
contributing more environmental benefits in the
continuous CRP and the CREP, a critical policy
question remains: Are the considerably higher pro-
gram payments economically justifiable?
Theoretically, rental payments in the land retire-
ment programs should be designed to compensate
the losses of farmers’ expected returns from crop
production on the land to be retired. However, the
determination of land rental payments required for
participation is complicated for several reasons.
First, farmers make their participation decisions
under uncertainty about cropping returns due to
fluctuations of crop yields and output prices.
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Second, participation in land retirement programs
requires farmers to enter into 10- to 15-year binding
contracts with the USDA. Program participants are
allowed to terminate their contracts before the expi-
ration date only if they reimburse all government
payments received—including rental payments,
cost-share payments, and incentive payments, plus
interest and a liquidating cost calculated as 25% of
the annual rental payments times the number of
acres being terminated
3 (Scott, 2003). Furthermore,
farmers who exit the program will lose their invest-
ments on establishing conservation covers and must
bear additional costs for converting conservation
covers into cropland.
From an economic perspective, participation in
land retirement programs involves an irreversible
decision because such a decision is very costly to
reverse (Dixit and Pindyck, 1994). Hence, the land
rental payments required for participation depend
on how farmers make their participation decisions.
Understanding the role of uncertainty and irreversi-
bility in determining land rental payments, and con-
sequently in targeting of a least-cost land retirement
program, is an important policy question that needs
to be addressed.
The purpose of this study is to develop a model
for examining the impacts of alternative farmer deci-
sion making on determining land rental payments
and least-cost land retirement targeting in conserva-
tion programs. By taking into account uncertainty
about crop production and irreversibility of program
participation, the model analyzes the implications
of designing appropriate land rental payment
schemes that compensate farmers’ losses of expected
returns from crop production on the land to be
retired. The model is empirically applied to an agri-
cultural watershed in the Illinois CREP region, and
relevant policy implications are discussed.
From a social planner’s perspective, the typical
decision problem in land retirement programs is to
select a small set of land to be retired from a large
set of eligible land in order to achieve specified
environmental objectives while minimizing program
payments. In addressing this decision problem, a
number of studies have proposed a targeting ap-
proach for improving the cost-effectiveness of such
programs. It has been shown that the CRP benefits
could be improved through better targeting based
on off-site benefits (Ribaudo, 1986, 1989; Heimlich
and Osborn, 1993) or benefit-to-cost criteria
(Babcock et al., 1996, 1997). While these studies
examined CRP targeting at the regional or national
level, Khanna et al. (2003) developed a watershed-
level land retirement targeting scheme to identify
land parcels for retirement for achieving water
quality objectives at least costs. However, the costs
of land retirement in these studies are typically
represented by foregone cropping returns which are
estimated based on crop yields, output prices, and
production costs. In particular, when assessing the
cost-effectiveness of land retirement programs, none
of these studies examined how farmers make their
participation decisions.
Appropriate assessment of the cost-effectiveness
of land retirement programs requires incorporating
farmer decision making into the social planner’s
land retirement targeting. Several studies have
examined the impacts of farmers’ risk attitudes on
the required land rental rates for program parti-
cipation. Hope and Lingard (1990) concluded that
increases in the degree of risk aversion would make
land retirement more attractive to farmers for the
set-aside program in the United Kingdom. This
finding implies lower program premiums would be
acceptable for high risk-averse farmers. Consist-
ently, several other studies also found that in the
set-aside program, additional incentives could
generate more land retirement for high risk-averse
farmers (Fraser, 1991; Roberts, Froud, and Fraser,
1996). However, risk aversion would not justify
why the land rental payments in the continuous
CRP or the CREP are considerably higher than the
soil rental rates.
Considering uncertainty about crop production
and irreversibility of program participation is
important in analyzing the required land rental
payments and the cost-effectiveness of land retire-
ment programs because farmers’ participation in the
programs is similar to the technology adoption
decision under uncertainty. Studies on investment
under uncertainty show that decision makers could
delay their investment decisions to learn more
about the value of technology or economic con-
ditions before making irreversible decisions (Dixit
and Pindyck, 1994). A number of studies have
recently applied the theory of irreversible invest-
ment in analyzing the adoption of agricultural
technologies (e.g., Purvis et al., 1995; Isik, Khanna,
and Winter-Nelson, 2001; Carey and Zilberman,
2002).
3  The Federal Agriculture Improvement and Reform (FAIR) Act of
1996 allowed participants with contracts signed before 1995 to withdraw
from the CRP without penalty. However, certain environmentally sensi-
tive CRP acres were ineligible for early termination. The purpose was to
release those CRP acres that contributed less environmental benefits
through the sign-ups with soil erosion criteria.Yang and Isik Integrating Farmer Decision Making to Target Land Retirement Programs   235
In this investigation, we extend the application of
the theory of irreversible investment to examine the
implications of farmer decision making for partici-
pation in land retirement programs under uncertainty.
A framework is developed for assessing the impacts
of uncertainty about crop production and irreversi-
bility of program participation on determining land
rental payments and least-cost land retirement
targeting. The theoretical framework is laid out in
the next section, followed by a description of the
empirical applications and data. The results of the
empirical applications are then presented. The
paper ends with our conclusions and a discussion of
policy implications.
The Theoretical Model
The model is based on the social planner’s decision
problem in targeting least-cost land retirement in an
agricultural watershed. Land parcels are identified
to achieve an off-site pollution abatement goal while
minimizing program costs in terms of land rental
payments to farmers. Assume a watershed has N
eligible land parcels, and each parcel is of size Xi
acres, where i = 1, ..., N. All other land parcels in
the watershed are assumed to be unchanged in the
land retirement program. For simplicity, we
consider only off-site sediment abatement as the
environmental benefit achieved by land retirement.
The off-site sediment abatement refers to the reduc-
tion of sediment delivered from fields to the nearest
waterway in agricultural watersheds.
The off-site sediment abatement per acre due to
the proportion of land parcel i taken out of crop
production is denoted by S(Ci, Oi), where Ci indi-
cates land characteristics which include land use,
land quality, distance to the water body, and other
attributes, and Oi indicates the impacts of off-site
sediment generation from other land parcels in the
same surface runoff channel. The off-site sediment
abatement is defined as the difference in off-site
sediment loading between when the land parcel is
in crop production and when it is in the land retire-
ment program. The off-site sediment abatement due
to retiring of a land parcel depends not only on the
soil characteristics and land use of that parcel, but
also on the volume of runoff flowing in from
upslope parcels; this volume in turn depends on
land use decisions and site-specific characteristics
of upslope parcels (Khanna et al., 2003).
The social planner needs to compensate farmers’
losses due to the retirement of agricultural land from
crop productions. Let R(Ci | η) be the minimum
necessary per acre land rental payment to be pro-
vided to farmers for compensating their losses of
expected returns on land parcel i from land retire-
ment, depending on their decision-making criteria
(η). Alternative farmer decision-making criteria that
determine participation constraints in the program
are discussed below, along with their implications
for designing incentive mechanisms to induce
farmer participation in the land retirement program.
The Social Planner’s Decision Problem
The social planner’s problem is to identify land par-
cels to be retired to achieve a given level of sediment
abatement (}) in an agricultural watershed while
minimizing the total cost of the program in terms of
land rental payments.
4 Let θi be the proportion of
land parcel i to be retired.
5 The model is repre-
sented as follows:
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The Lagrangian of the optimization model can be
written as:












where λ and µi are the Lagrange multipliers associ-
ated with (2) and (3), respectively (λ $ 0). The first-
order conditions are as follows:
4  The social planner’s problem could also be formulated as the maximi-
zation of environmental benefits subject to a budget constraint. However,
the budget constraint is typically set at the national, state, or regional
level. In a specific watershed, the budget constraint is unknown because
program funds are not further allocated at the watershed level. Therefore,
we model the social planner’s problem as minimizing program costs
subject to the environmental objectives set by the programs.
5  It is possible to assume that θi is a binary decision variable, taking the
value of one if a parcel participates and zero if it does not. Since it is
theoretically possible to enroll some proportions of a parcel to the pro-
gram, θi is not restricted to be one or zero in the theoretical model.236   October 2004 Agricultural and Resource Economics Review
(5)   ML
Mθi
' XiR(Ci*η) & λXiS(Ci, Oi) % µi $ 0,
and ML
Mθi
θi ' 0, œ i.
After rearrangement, (5) can be written as:
(6)   λXiS(Ci, Oi) & XiR(Ci*η) # µi, œ i.
On the left-hand side of equation (6), the marginal
cost of sediment abatement λ, multiplied by sedi-
ment abatement XiS(Ci, Oi) from the retirement of
land parcel i, represents the social benefits of land
retirement. The term XiR(Ci|η) could be considered
as the costs of the retirement of land parcel i to the
government. The difference between the two, µi,
indicates the net social benefits provided by land
parcel i if retired. Because the marginal cost λ is a
constant at a given sediment abatement constraint,
equation (6) also implies that a land parcel with
a higher benefit-to-cost ratio, S(Ci,Oi)/R(Ci|η),
would be selected for land retirement.
An important issue in solving the above social
planner’s problem is to identify an incentive mech-
anism which induces farmer participation in the
land retirement program. Most previous studies
consider R(Ci | η) as the opportunity cost of crop
production or losses of cropping returns on the land
parcel to be retired. However, land rental payments
required for participation in the program, R(Ci | η),
could also depend on how farmers make their par-
ticipation decisions in the land retirement program
and their risk preferences. Thus, solving the
decision problem in (1)S(3) requires incorporating
farmer decision making into the model, which deter-
mines participation constraints. In other words, the
social planner must establish the appropriate value
of R(Ci|η) that will make farmers indifferent be-
tween participating in the land retirement program
and continuing their risky farming operations.
We now incorporate alternative farmer decision
making (represented by η) into (1) and analyze
implications of those decision-making scenarios for
the marginal cost of sediment abatement. The
expected returns from the land currently in crop
production depend on various factors such as land
characteristics and how farmers make their parti-
cipation decisions. Given uncertainty about crop
production and irreversibility of program partici-
pation, R(Ci|η) would depend not only on the op-
portunity costs of crop production, but also on the
farmer’s decision-making criteria (η). If the farmer
is risk neutral, R(Ci | η) is the expected returns from
crop production on the land parcel to be retired, i.e.,
R(Ci|η) = ER(Ci).
If the farmer were risk averse, he or she would
reduce the variability of returns by participating in
the land retirement program and would require less
for land retirement. To determine the minimum
rental payments required for participation, it is
assumed for simplicity that the utility function is
represented by a negative exponential function,
U = !e
!ο | R, where ο |  is the absolute risk-aversion co-
efficient. With a negative exponential utility function
and normally distributed R(Ci), the certainty equiv-
alent of expected returns under risk aversion for Xi
acres of land is represented by

















is the risk premium. Thus, under risk aversion,
θiXiR(Ci | η) will be replaced by 








in solving the social planner’s decision problem
given in (1).
6
When the irreversibility of program participation
is taken into account, farmers would require the
rental payment to be at least ΓER(Ci) to compensate
their losses of cropping returns for participation in
the land retirement program, where Γ>1 is the
option value multiplier (see the appendix for further
details). The extent to which uncertainty and irrever-
sibility affect the farmer participation depends on the
value of Γ (Dixit and Pindyck, 1994). Thus, uncer-
tainty and irreversibility cause farmers to be com-
pensated at least ΓER(Ci) in order to participate in
the land retirement program, and therefore R(Ci | η)
= ΓER(Ci) in (1).
Marginal Cost of Sediment Abatement 
Under Alternative Models
Under risk neutrality only, the condition for least-
cost land retirement is given by λXiS(Ci, Oi) ! µi #
XiER(Ci). The marginal cost of sediment abatement
6  Note that these results are conditional on the assumption of a negative
exponential utility function and normally distributed R(Ci).Yang and Isik Integrating Farmer Decision Making to Target Land Retirement Programs   237
under risk neutrality is denoted as λ
RN. Under risk
aversion only, the condition for least-cost land
retirement is represented by 
λXiS(Ci, Oi) & µi
# XiER(Ci) & ο | θiX
2
i Var(R).
The marginal cost of sediment abatement under risk
aversion is defined as λ
RA. Because Var(R) > 0, then
λ
RN > λ
RA. Under uncertainty and irreversibility, the
condition for the least-cost land retirement is given
by λXiS(Ci,Oi)!µi # ΓXiER(Ci). The marginal cost
of sediment abatement under uncertainty and
irreversibility is denoted as λ





Based on these results, when only risk aversion
is considered in land retirement programs, the mar-
ginal cost of sediment abatement is less than that
under risk neutrality, and this would lead to lower
program costs in terms of land rental payments.
However, when irreversibility of program participa-
tion is considered, the marginal cost of abatement
is higher than that under risk neutrality or risk
aversion only.
In addition to the marginal cost of abatement,
solving the above model empirically would generate
total costs of the program and the least-cost land
retirement patterns. It is reasonable to expect that
eligible land parcels in an agricultural watershed
are heterogeneous. How land heterogeneity, in con-
junction with uncertainty and irreversibility, impacts
on determining the changes in the magnitude of land
rental payments and the least-cost land retirement
pattern is an empirical question to be examined
further.
Empirical Applications and Data
We develop an empirical model to apply the above
theoretical model to the Otter Creek Watershed in
Fulton County, situated in the Illinois Conservation
Reserve Enhancement Program (CREP) region. The
Illinois CREP is a supplementary program of the
CRP for improving water quality in the Illinois
River Basin. With a budget of about $500 million,
the program aims at retiring 232,000 acres of crop-
land for 15 to 30 years in order to achieve environ-
mental objectives such as reducing sediment loading
by 20% and nitrate loading by 10% in the Illinois
River and its tributaries. To accomplish these goals,
the Illinois CREP limits enrollment primarily to a
narrow buffer zone adjacent to rivers and streams,
85% of which are to be selected from riparian areas
(defined as the 100-year floodplains of the Illinois
River and its tributaries, streams, and wetlands).
The remaining 15% could be selected from highly
erodible cropland adjacent to enrolled riparian areas
(Khanna et al., 2003).
The Otter Creek Watershed is comprised of
68,314 acres of land, of which 47% is cropland,
25% is grassland, 25% is woodland, and the remain-
ing 3% is urban, water, and miscellaneous land.
The watershed is also relatively flat, with 71% of
the land having less than 5% slope. We partitioned
the watershed into 300-by-300 foot parcels (2.07
acres per parcel), resulting in about 33,000 parcels
for the entire watershed. This parcel size is con-
sistent with actual CREP enrollment contracts in the
study area, where the size of the smallest land
parcels enrolled in the program is about two acres.
Because the Illinois CREP is essentially a buffer
program in which cropland on floodplains or
adjacent sloping land is eligible, we define cropland
within a 900-foot buffer of water bodies as eligible
land in the empirical model—which is consistent
with the definition established under CREP. This
leads to 4,691 eligible land parcels or 9,710 acres,
representing 30% of the total cropland in the water-
shed.
The on-site erosion and off-site sediment gener-
ated by eligible land parcels are estimated with the
Agricultural Nonpoint Source Pollution (AGNPS)
model, a hydrologic model widely applied to simu-
late movements of sediment and nutrients in agri-
cultural watersheds. The AGNPS model requires
five parameters at the watershed level and 23 param-
eters at the parcel level
7 (Young et al., 1994; Young,
Onstad, and Bosch, 1995). In this study, the model
incorporates a typical five-year storm event with
3.73 inches of rainfall within 12 hours, based on
rainfall data from Huff and Angel (1989). Remote
sensing data (IDNR, 1996) are used to identify land
use in each land parcel. Elevation data (U.S. Geo-
logical Survey, 1997) are used to create flow paths
or channels that direct runoff from upland parcels
to the nearest water body. Soil erodibility factor,
texture, and hydrologic soil group are derived from
7  The five parameters at the watershed level are watershed name, cell
area, total number of cells, precipitation, and rainfall energy-intensity
value. The 23 parameters at the parcel level are cell number, flow direc-
tion, receiving cell number, channel indicator, runoff curve number, slope,
slope length, slope shape, channel slope gradient, channel side slope,
Manning’s roughness coefficient, soil texture, soil erodibility, cropping
management factor, conservation practice factor, surface condition
coefficient, fertilization application level, fertilization incorporation level,
chemical oxygen demand factor, point source indicator, erosion from other
sources, terrace impoundments, and feedlots.238   October 2004 Agricultural and Resource Economics Review
Table 1. Summary Statistics of Eligible Land in the Illinois Otter Creek Watershed
Variable Mean Std. Deviation Minimum Maximum
Distance from Water Bodies (feet) 392.2         242.2        150.0       750.0      
Slope (%) 3.3         2.8        0.5       21.0      
Soil Erodibility Factor 0.39         0.06        0.04       0.49      
Upland Sediment Inflow (tons/acre) 4.0         6.3        0.0       132.9      
On-Site Erosion (tons/acre) 12.2         13.3        0.3       161.7      
Quasi-Rent ($/acre) 145.2         29.7        31.0       215.7      
Total No. of Eligible Land Parcels 4,691.0                   
No. of Eligible Acres 9,710.4                   
Total Sediment Loading (tons) 29,996.3                   
soil data obtained from the Illinois Natural Resour-
ces Conservation Service (1996).
All other AGNPS parameters are obtained from
the USDA’s National Engineering Handbook
(1972) and the USDA/Soil Conservation Service
(1986) publication “Urban Hydrology for Small
Watersheds.” Through consultation with University
of Illinois hydrologists, input data for all AGNPS
input parameters were adjusted to assure compati-
bility with the conditions characterizing the study
area. The AGNPS model run shows that a typical
five-year storm event (3.73 inches of rainfall within
12 hours) would cause about 30,000 tons of sedi-
ment to be loaded into water bodies in the water-
shed, given existing patterns of land use.
Summary statistics for the eligible land parcels in
the watershed are reported in table 1. The land par-
cels differ considerably in their distance from water
bodies, slope, erodibility index, upland sediment
inflow, and on-site erosion. The distance from
water bodies reflects the position of all eligible land
parcels within the watershed. The eligible land par-
cels within the watershed have an average distance
from water bodies of 392 feet. These parcels are
relatively flat, with an average slope of 3.3%.
However, relative landscape variations still exist,
with slopes ranging from 0.5% to 21%. The soil
erodibility factor (K) varies between 0.04 and 0.49,
with an average of 0.39, which represents a modest
erodibility condition. The amount of upland sedi-
ment inflow varies from 0.0 to 133 tons per acre,
with an average of four tons per acre. While some
parcels generate as little as 0.3 tons on-site erosion
per acre, others could generate on-site erosion as
high as 162 tons per acre. The average on-site
erosion rate is 12 tons per acre.
A difficulty in estimating off-site sediment abate-
ment achieved by retired land parcels is accounting
for the interdependence of land parcels when deter-
mining off-site sediment abatement benefits. In
order to solve this problem, we consider flow chains
within the eligible region (i.e., comprised of crop-
land within a 900-foot buffer of water bodies) as
decision units, and each flow chain consists of at
most three 300-by-300 parcels.
8 Of the runoff chan-
nels covering the watershed, 2,594 channels contain
eligible cropland within 900 feet of water bodies.
It is assumed each land parcel is either retired or
in crop production, and all eight (= 2
3) possible
alternative land retirement options for each flow
chain within a surface runoff channel are defined as
follows: CCC, GCC, CGC, CCG, GGC, CGG,
GCG, and GGG, where C denotes crop production
and G denotes land retirement with grass cover.
9
Land uses of all other parcels outside the eligible
region are assumed to be unchanged in the land
retirement program. Note that the three-parcel chains
in the buffer region are linked to the inland water-
shed so that runoff and sediment transport from up-
land parcels beyond the eligible region are tracked
and incorporated into the sediment transport process
within the eligible region.
The AGNPS model is run for the eight land retire-
ment options to obtain off-site sediment abatement
8  Land parcels in a watershed constitute a flow network based on hy-
drology. However, it is very difficult to use the network structure in an
optimization model. In order to make the optimization model operational
while considering the connection of land parcels in the flow structure, we
organize land parcels in the buffer area into linear flow chains through the
Geographic Information System (GIS). Within the linear flow chains, the
same land parcel only appears once. The formulation of linear flow chains
has the advantage of avoiding conflicting land use types while examining
different land retirement options in the buffer area. Furthermore, the
connection between land parcels is still retained because land use changes
will be put back into GIS to run the AGNPS hydrologic model. Sediment
abatement is defined as the reduction of sediment at the end of each flow
chain or delivered to the water body.
9  For example, GCG indicates the first and third parcels from a water
body are in grass cover, and the second parcel is in crop production.Yang and Isik Integrating Farmer Decision Making to Target Land Retirement Programs   239
for each flow chain and each land retirement option,
designated by Amp, where m = 1, ..., M denotes flow
chains in the eligible region and p denotes the eight
land retirement options. While the off-site sediment
abatement for each parcel is still dependent on its
own characteristics and upslope runoff in the same
runoff channel, by changing decision-making units
from the land parcels to the flow chains, we circum-
vent the computational difficulties arising from the
interdependency of individual land parcels in deter-
mining off-site sediment abatement as characterized
in the theoretical model.
Corresponding cropping returns are obtained for
the eight land retirement options in each flow chain,
denoted as Rmp. The estimation of cropping returns
is based on a crop budget model (University of Illi-
nois, FaRM Laboratory, 1995). Within the model,
a typical 700-acre farm with corn-soybean rotation
and reduced tillage is assumed. The returns are
defined as total revenue minus total variable costs,
which include machinery use, fertilizer and pesti-
cide costs, crop insurance premium, and interest
paid for capital. Crop yield information based on
soil productivity is obtained from Olson and Lang
(1994). The machinery use costs in terms of main-
tenance, repair, and fuel and labor costs are
estimated from a machinery program developed by
Siemens (1998). The use of fertilizers, pesticides,
and other chemicals is based on the Illinois Agron-
omy Handbook (Illinois Cooperative Extension
Service, 1999). The crop insurance premium is
calculated using data from the USDA’s Risk
Management Agency (1999). The 5% interest rate
reflects the average loan rates in 1998.
Based on the above justification, cropping returns
are estimated for each soil type and then assigned to
eligible land parcels through GIS. The eligible land
is highly productive in nature, with an average re-
turn of $145 per acre. However, as shown in table 1,
significant differences in productivity exist across
the land parcels. The minimum return is $31 per
acre, while the maximum is $216 per acre.
The theoretical model shows the estimation of
expected returns depends on two key parameters:
risk-aversion coefficients (ο | ), and the factor that
affects the magnitude of uncertainty and irrever-
sibility (Γ). There is no consensus regarding the
magnitude of risk-aversion coefficients (ο | ) in the
literature (e.g., Babcock, Choi, and Feinerman,
1993; Weersink, Dutka, and Goss, 1998). For this
analysis, two alternative risk-aversion coefficients
were chosen—low risk aversion at 0.005 and high
risk aversion at 0.01—consistent with the range of
risk-aversion coefficients evaluated by Lambert
(1990).
The variance of the returns is estimated for each
land parcel based on the sample of all eligible land
parcels. The variances of the returns for each flow
chain and land retirement option are standardized
by coefficient of variation (CV). In this study, CV
' 0.38, which is estimated from the cropping returns
data for Fulton County, Illinois [USDA/National
Agricultural Statistics Service (NASS), 2001]. Thus,
the rental rate required for retiring an acre of land
from crop production for flow chain m and land
retirement option p under risk aversion is
Rmp & ο |
2
(CV(Rmp)2 .
Using the returns received by farmers in Fulton
County, we also estimated the irreversibility factor,
Γ ' β &1
β
,
where β < 0 is the smaller root of 0.5σ
2β(β !1) !
αβ ! ρ ' 0 (see the appendix). The drift parameter
α is estimated as α ' µ + (0.5)σ
2, where µ is the
mean of the series ln(Rt+1/Rt), and σ is the standard
deviation of the series (Forsyth, 2000). A 5% dis-
count rate is assumed in the estimation of β. Using
historical data on the average crop returns from corn
and soybean productions over the period 1950S2000
in Illinois (USDA/NASS, 2001), intermediate
parameters are estimated, such as ln(Rt+1/Rt), µ, σ,
and β, and the irreversibility factor Γ ' 1.45 is
obtained for Fulton County.
10 The minimum land
rental rate required to participate in the CREP under
uncertainty and irreversibility is then represented as
ΓRmp.
As noted earlier, the decision unit is defined as a
flow chain instead of single land parcels. The social
planner’s problem is to select a land retirement
option p in each flow chain m to achieve the 20%








Amp $ ¯ A,
10  The value of Γ could vary across heterogeneous soil characteristics,
and therefore across Rmp. Because we do not have the historical data at the
soil type level in this county, and because the study area is relatively
small, for simplicity we assume the value of Γ is, on average, the same
for all land parcels considered here.240   October 2004 Agricultural and Resource Economics Review










Number of Parcels Enrolled 451 448 539 451
Land Enrolled (acres) 933.6  927.4  1,115.7 933.6 
Percentage of Overlapping Parcels Compared
    to Certainty Case (%) — 98 72 100
Total Cost of Abatement
 a ($) 114,492.4  102,460.5  86,330.8 166,013.9 
Average Cost of Abatement ($/ton)  19.1  17.1 14.4  27.7
Marginal Cost of Abatement ($/ton)  35.6  31.9 25.6  51.6
Average Payment to Farmers ($/acre) 122.6  110.5  77.4 177.8 
a Total cost of abatement is represented by the total rental payments made to farmers to retire their land.
while minimizing the program costs with respect to
land rental payments compensating the losses of ex-
pected returns on the land parcels to be retired. The
model ranks flow chains and associated land retire-
ment options based on their benefits in terms of
sediment abatement to their cost ratios, and chooses
flow chains from the highest benefit-to-cost ratio
until the sediment goal is met. This model is solved
for each scenario of risk aversion and irreversibility
to obtain marginal cost of sediment abatement, total
cost of the program, and the least-cost land retire-
ment pattern in the watershed.
Results
The empirical model is run for different scenarios
of alternative farmer decision-making and participa-
tion constraints to identify least-cost land retirement
patterns for achieving the 20% sediment abatement
goal in the Otter Creek Watershed. The results are
presented in table 2. In the base scenario under risk
neutrality and no irreversibility, 451 land parcels or
934 acres of cropland must be retired in order to
achieve the 20% off-site sediment abatement in
water bodies of the watershed. The targeted acreage
for land retirement is about 10% of the eligible land
in the watershed. The program cost in terms of land
rental payments for compensating farmers’ cropping
return losses is about $114,000 per year. The
marginal cost of sediment abatement is $36 per ton,
and the average land rental payment that should be
provided to farmers in the watershed is $123 per
acre.
When farmers are assumed to be risk averse or
face an irreversible decision of participating in
conservation programs, the required land rental
payments for compensating farmers’ losses of
expected cropping returns are different depending
on the scenarios of risk aversion and irreversibility.
When only risk aversion is considered in modeling
farmer participation, the program cost in terms of
land rental payments is less than under the scenario
of risk neutrality. This is because risk-averse
farmers require less compensation for their losses
of expected cropping returns compared to risk-
neutral farmers.
In the low risk-aversion scenario (table 2), 448
land parcels or 927 acres of cropland need to be
retired to achieve the 20% sediment abatement goal,
which is similar to the land retirement acreage
under the risk-neutrality scenario. However, the
program cost in terms of land rental payments
(approximately $102,000) is less than that under
risk neutrality (about $114,000). Correspondingly,
the marginal cost of sediment abatement is $32 per
ton, and the average land rental payment to  farmers
is $111 per acre.
Under the scenario of high risk aversion (table
2), 539 land parcels or 1,116 acres of cropland must
be retired in order to achieve the 20% sediment
abatement goal. While the land retirement acreage
is increased by 20% compared to the risk-neutrality
scenario, the program cost decreases by 25% (about
$86,000 per year). The corresponding marginal cost
of sediment abatement is $26 per ton, and the aver-
age payment to farmers is $77 per acre.
Because the risk premium could vary across
heterogeneous land parcels, land retirement patterns
under risk aversion are different from those under
risk neutrality (table 2). In the scenario of low risk
aversion, 11 land parcels, or 2% of the targeted land
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parcels in the risk-neutrality case. In contrast, under
the high risk-aversion scenario, the number of non-
overlapping parcels rises to 153, or 28% of the total
selected parcels in the watershed. This spatial shift
is explained by a change in the benefit-to-cost ratios
of eligible land parcels when the risk-aversion fac-
tor is considered, and the land retirement is moved
toward those land parcels having higher benefit-to-
cost ratios.
Under uncertainty and irreversibility, land retire-
ment patterns are similar to those under the risk-
neutrality scenario (table 2) because the irreversi-
bility factor scales up the rental payments required
to participate in the program. As a result, the
program cost in terms of rental payments to be
provided to farmers increases considerably ($178
per acre compared to $123 per acre). Under uncer-
tainty and irreversibility, the land retired consists of
451 land parcels, identical to the scenario under risk
neutrality. However, the total cost of the program
under uncertainty and irreversibility reaches about
$166,000 per year, which is 45% higher than the
cost under the scenario of risk neutrality only. The
corresponding marginal cost of sediment abatement
is $52 per ton. As expected, the total cost of land
retirement and marginal cost of abatement under
uncertainty and irreversibility are also considerably
higher than those under risk aversion only.
These results may provide a justification for the
considerably higher program payments in the con-
tinuous CRP or the CREP. For example, in Fulton
County where the Otter Creek Watershed is located,
the average soil rental rate was $87 per acre in 1998
for the five-year Illinois CREP. However, the actual
average CREP program payments in 1999, 2000,
and 2001 were $142, $152, and $167 per acre,
respectively, representing increases ranging from
63% to 92% (USDA/FSA, 2003). Although the
actual program payments are considerably higher
than the average soil rental rate, these payments are
below the average land rental payment estimated
under the scenario of uncertainty and irreversibility
($178 per acre, table 2). This finding indicates that
when the irreversibility of the program participation
decision is considered, the actual CREP land rental
payments are reasonable in compensating the losses
of farmers’ expected cropping returns.
Implications of a Uniform Bid Cap in the 
Scenario of Uncertainty and Irreversibility
While a bidding cap is currently not applicable to the
continuous CRP or the CREP, the empirical model
is also applied to examine the implications of a
uniform bidding cap for land retirement programs.
It is important to examine the potential policy impli-
cations of introducing such a land rental instrument
for the continuous CRP or the CREP. Typically in
regular CRP sign-ups, a soil-based bid cap is set at
the county level and land parcels with higher EBI
scores relative to costs of bids would be accepted to
the program. Apparently, the bid cap could be set
differently depending on the alternative farmer
decision-making criteria examined above. Then, an
important question to consider would be how a uni-
form bid cap determined assuming risk neutrality
would work when farmers actually make their
participation decisions under uncertainty of crop
production and irreversibility of program partici-
pation.
We first determine a uniform bid cap required to
achieve the 20% sediment abatement goal in the
watershed assuming farmers are risk neutral. A
heuristic procedure is built into the least-cost
targeting model to identify the uniform bid cap
which would induce land retirement in order to
achieve the 20% sediment abatement goal. The land
rental payment is the minimum of the bid cap and
estimated cropping returns. In the beginning a low
bid cap is set, land parcels with cropping returns
below the cap are selected, and the sediment abate-
ment achieved by these parcels is summarized. The
bid cap is increased by small increments until the
environmental goal in the watershed is achieved.
The model indicates a uniform rental rate of $140
per acre would achieve the 20% sediment abate-
ment by enrolling farmlands with the expected
returns at or below $140 per acre.
We examine the impacts of this uniform bid cap
set assuming risk neutrality when farmers actually
make an irreversible decision of land retirement
under uncertainty. The uniform bid cap under the
risk-neutrality scenario is applied to the scenario of
uncertainty and irreversibility to identify land
parcels that would be retired, and the sediment
abatement and the cost of abatement are estimated.
As a result, 493 acres of cropland are selected for
retirement. The achieved sediment abatement is
2,579 tons, which is only 42% of the 6,000-ton
abatement target (table 3).
The sediment abatement achieved under uncer-
tainty and irreversibility is significantly lower than
the program goal. Based on these results, if a
uniform bid cap is designated without considering
uncertainty and irreversibility, then applying the
policy instrument would not achieve the program242   October 2004 Agricultural and Resource Economics Review
Table 3. Impact of a Uniform Bid Cap Under
Risk Neutrality on Land Retirement and Cost
of Abatement Under Irreversibility
Variable
Uncertainty and
    Irreversibility
Uniform Bid Cap Under Risk Neutrality ($/acre)      140.0
Land Enrolled (acres) 492.7   
Abatement Achieved (tons) 2,579.2   
Percentage of Abatement Target Achieved (%) 42.1  
goal. Otherwise, the uniform bid cap must be raised.
These findings provide insights for setting appro-
priate levels of bidding caps for inducing farmers’
participation in land retirement programs. The
results also imply that conservation programs like
the CREP do not impose bid caps because they en-
courage farmer participation by providing additional
incentives in order to meet the program goals.
Conclusions and Policy Implications
This study has examined the impacts of alternative
farmer decision making on determining land rental
payments and least-cost land retirement targeting in
agricultural conservation programs. It takes into
account uncertainty about crop production and
irreversibility of program participation to analyze
the economic incentives necessary for inducing
farmer participation in land retirement programs.
The model is empirically applied to the Conser-
vation Reserve Enhancement Program (CREP) in
the Otter Creek Watershed in Illinois.
In achieving the 20% sediment abatement goal in
the watershed, results show the marginal cost of
sediment abatement and the average land rental
payment under risk aversion are less than those
under risk neutrality. However, when the irrever-
sibility of program participation is considered, the
marginal cost of sediment abatement and the aver-
age land rental payment are considerably higher
than those under scenarios of risk neutrality or risk
aversion only. Furthermore, the model results
indicate that if a bidding system were introduced, a
uniform bid cap determined under the assumption
of risk neutrality would achieve far less sediment
abatement than the program goal when it is applied
to the scenario of uncertainty and irreversibility.
The success of land retirement programs highly
depends on appropriate design of land rental
payment instruments to compensate the losses of
farmers’ expected returns. Statistics reveal the land
rental payments in the continuous CRP or the CREP
are considerably higher than the local soil rental
rates. When irreversibility of the land retirement
program participation is considered, the findings of
this analysis suggest the land rental payments needed
for inducing farmers’ participation in the program
should be higher than the payments specified under
the assumption of risk neutrality only. Furthermore,
if a bidding system were implemented, the uniform
bid caps determined with the assumption of risk
neutrality only would not be attractive to many
farmers who make the program participation deci-
sion under uncertainty and irreversibility. Conse-
quently, the bid caps need to be raised in order to
encourage more farmers to participate in the
program.
The results have implications for the design of
policy instruments in land retirement programs.
Given the uncertainty about crop production and
irreversibility of program participation, incentive
payments in addition to the land rental payments
based on local land markets would be provided to
farmers to account for the value of waiting. Cur-
rently, only continuous sign-ups in the CRP or the
CREP offer additional incentives to farmers for
implementing conservation practices that provide
more environmental benefits such as filter strips and
buffers, or for retiring land in areas of environ-
mental significance. In light of our modeling
results, it would be useful to reexamine the bidding
system and payment levels of regular sign-ups in
the CRP.
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Appendix: Modeling Farmer’s Participation
Decision in the Land Retirement Program
We model a risk-neutral farmer’s participation decision
in the land retirement program under uncertainty and
irreversibility. Let V be the annualized present value of
the rental rate over the participation period to be deter-
mined, which induces the farmer’s participation in the
land retirement program. V is assumed to be stochastic,
and evolves according to the following geometric
Brownian motion process:244   October 2004 Agricultural and Resource Economics Review
(A1) dR ' αRdt % σRdz,
where dz is the increment of a Wiener process with mean
zero and unit variance, α is the expected growth rate, and
σ is the volatility in the growth rate. A number of studies
have shown that returns from agricultural production or
output prices can be represented by a geometric Brownian
motion process (Purvis et al., 1995; Isik, Khanna, and
Winter-Nelson, 2001; Carey and Zilberman, 2002). 
In this paper, a geometric Brownian motion is chosen
to preserve analytical clarity and ensure tractability. This
hypothesis is consistent with most theoretical and empir-
ical models assessing option values. General conclusions
about the effects of uncertainty on decision making still
hold when returns may follow an alternative stochastic
process (Dixit and Pindyck, 1994).
The farmer’s decision problem is to maximize the net
returns from participation in the land retirement program
by choosing an optimal time t subject to (A1) as:
(A2) F(R) ' Max
t
E(Vt & Rt).
Dynamic optimization techniques are used to derive the
optimal participation rule. The Bellman equation is
ρF(R)dt ' E[F(R)], where ρ is the discount rate. Using
Ito’s lemma to expand the right-hand side of this
expression, F(R) can be shown to satisfy 0.5(σ
2R
2FR) +
αRFR ! ρR ' 0. This differential equation is solved with
respect to the boundary conditions: F(0) ' 0, F(R) '
V ! R, and FR(R) ' !1.
Following Dixit and Pindyck (1994), we obtain the
threshold return to be received at which it is optimal to
participate at year zero:
 where  V
(
0 ' ΓR0, Γ ' β &1
β
>1,
with β < 0 being the smaller root of 0.5σ
2β(β !1) ! αβ !
ρ ' 0. The magnitude of this factor determines the extent
to which uncertainty and irreversibility affect the partici-
pation decision. This factor increases with an increase in
σ and/or a decrease in α. This decision rule requires the
farmer to be compensated at least ΓR0 to participate in the
land retirement program today.